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THE LIVING TRUST
By Edward C. King of the Denver Bar.
HE title of this paper involves two different, but related,
aspects of the subject of living trusts; the first its sphere
of usefulness, and the second its validity as against the
personal representative of the deceased donor. The first is
closely related to the second because if living trusts are inherently beneficial to the donor and his family, just as regards
creditors, conducive to saving and thrift, and economical as a
method of disposing of one's estate, they will continue to
grow in popularity, and the courts, following the economic
trend, will encourage their use and will be reluctant to question their validity. Moreover, if the device is desirable and
economically sound, it must follow as a correlative that it is in
accord with public policy. To paraphrase a statement in a
recent decision of one of the New York Courts it must be true
that if the act of a man in creating a trust which will encourage
thrift and which will ensure the investment of his funds in
sound, non-speculative securities is consonant with the dictates
of public policy, any arrangement which tends to add to the
value of his act, such as the protection of his dependents after
his death, should be entitled to even greater public favor.
With this as a premise then, I will first briefly consider the
living trust with regard to its usefulness or place in the economic structure, and then from the practicable standpoint,
attempt to state the existing laws relative to its validity.
In a discussion of its uses the living trust may profitably
be divided into its two different phases or purposes: one being
the purpose which it serves during the lifetime of the donor,
and the other its use in effecting a disposition of the trust
property after the death of the donor. The value and the
usefulness of a living trust for the services which the trustee
may render during the lifetime of the donor depend to a great
extent on the character of the donor's property, his business
and investing experience and the extent to which be travels
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or is otherwise absent from his home or office or is incapacitated to give careful attention to the business of investing his
funds. If he lacks time to care for his investments, or if he
lacks experience or judgment in selecting and managing investments; if he travels extensively or finds the problems of
bookkeeping and accounting burdensome or annoying, either
a safe-keeping agency or a living trust is really a necessity.
If his capital is invested in tangible chattels or if he is engaged
in trade to such an extent that his assets are constantly changing in form, the living trust is not entirely practicable, but
the contrary is true when a relatively important part of his
property is in money, stocks, bonds, mortgages, or real estate.
A trust of this type may be used for the purpose of creating,
conserving, or distributing estates. It may be used advantageously in place of a savings account or a safe-keeping account. By the creation of a trust of this nature the donor
can virtually assure, for the time limited by the rule against
perpetuities, the preservation of his original capital and a
net income equal to five per cent. of the principal. During
his lifetime the donor has an opportunity to observe the methods of the trustee in handling the trust estate and if the trust
is to continue after his death, can be fairly certain that the
management will continue in a manner satisfactory to his
beneficiaries. These statements assume of course the selection
of a thoroughly dependable trustee, expert in making and
managing investments, carefully supervised, and capable of
giving definite assurance of a continuing existence.
With respect to its second purpose-the disposition of
the donor's property after death-a comparison of the methods
by which one may dispose of his estate is, in most cases, distinctly favorable to the living trust. The three methods in
common use are, in the order of their present popularity, (if
any can be called popular), first: by operation of the law
under the statutes relative to intestacy; second: by will; and
third: through the medium of the trust. If that which is true
is assumed as a fact, i. e., that the fees paid to a qualified
trustee during the lifetime of the donor are for value received,
the economy in the disposition of the property through the
medium of a trust as compared with disposition by will or
under the intestate laws is extremely significant. Omitting
from consideration inheritance and estate taxes, which we may

DICTA

assume will be collected in any event, the total cost of disposition of one's estate through the medium of a living trust and a
qualified trustee will seldom exceed l 2%, a low figure when
compared with four to six per cent when disposition. is made
in any other manner except by an absolute gift inter vivos.
In another respect the comparison is favorable, and that is in
its simplicity. With the living trust the petitions, notices,
inventories, reports, hearings and orders, delays and court appearances, all of which are incident to the administration
of an estate, are done away with. There is less publicity and
less inducement to persons to make fraudulent claims against
the estate, and in all respects the costs of dying are reduced to
a minimum. The donor knows exactly what the cost of devolution of his property will be, whereas, when the estate passes
by will or under the intestate laws, the deceased can never
foresee with certainty the expense which will be unavoidable
in the settlement of his estate in court even under the most
careful executorship. It would seem that the living trust
is a useful and economical device for the creation, conservation and disposition of estates; that its use therefore should
be encouraged, and that if created with proper motives-and
without intention of defrauding creditors it should meet with
more favor in the courts than any other plan for like purposes
which has thus far been devised.
These matters, of common knowledge to all well-informed
lawyers and trust company executives, have been so thoroughly
covered in text books, educational programs of trust companies, and magazine and newspaper articles, that any further
remarks would be redundant, and I will pass to the second
phase covered by the title: Validity as against the Personal
Representative of the Deceased Donor.
The general question which will here be considered is
the extent to which so-called living trusts are valid after the
death of the donor as against his personal representatives. This
question, however, cannot be covered in all of its ramifications
in the time afforded. The writer will therefore assume a
solvent and competent donor, an instrument purporting to
create a trust, identified property, apt words of present conveyance, and beneficiaries definitely ascertained or definitely
ascertainable by an act which has significance apart from its
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effect upon the disposition of the property. (1) Special
types of living trusts such as life insurance trusts, business insurance trusts, and trusts in which the donor is also trustee,
will not be considered except as they may be included in
general statements applicable to all living trusts. State statutes will not be discussed, but it will be assumed that every
state has a Statute of Wills which prescribes a method for the
testamentary disposition of property, and that any testamentary
disposition not made in compliance therewith is invalid.
Having made these assumptions, there remains only the
specific question: What powers may be reserved by the donor
without making the trust testamentary? It is this question
which has vexed attorneys and trust executives and its solution
is imperative. Impelled by a desire to settle this question and
to afford a basis for the adoption of some uniform rule with
respect thereto, the Trust Officers' Association of the Denver
Clearing House Banks performing trust functions, in the summer of 1929 appointed a Committee consisting of Mr. Robert
L. Stearns, of the law firm of Lewis and Grant, Mr. John L. J.
Hart, also an attorney, of the Trust Department of the Colorado National Bank, and the writer, to make a study of the
law relating to living trusts and to report to the Association.
The Committee, with the assistance of other attorneys, made
an examination of probably six hundred cases, of which the
more important were briefed. In addition the leading English
and American textbooks on the subject were studied, together
with current articles in the various legal publications and trust
services. During the course of its investigation the Committee
found that a similar, and probably more comprehensive survey, was being made by a Committee appointed by the American Law Institute to prepare a restatement of the law of trusts
and through correspondence with Professor Austin W. Scott,
Reporter for the Law Institute Committee, much valuable
advice was obtained and it was found that in most respects
his conclusions coincided with ours. The ultimate conclusions
hereafter stated are in substantial accord with those of the
Denver Committee, but the theories advanced in support of
the conclusions are to some degree original.
A study of the cases and textbooks reveal a divergence of
opinion and a lack of settled rules with regard to all but a few
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of the powers which may be reserved by the donor. It is
settled law that if, by the terms of the trust instrument no
interest passes to the beneficiary during the life of the donor
the intended trust is testamentary and invalid as against the
personal representative of the donor. (2) No citation of
authority is necessary to establish this point. It is equally well
settled that the reservation of a power of revocation alone
does not make the trust testamentary. (3) In fact it has been
held that a failure to reserve a power of revocation is ground
for cancellation. (4) So far as I have been able to determine
it has never been stated, except in Ohio, and perhaps in Indiana, that the reservation of a power of revocation rendered
an otherwise valid trust testamentary, and the Ohio decisions
(5) were based on one or both of two fallacies; one being that
revocable living trusts were novel and unauthorized devices
and the other that if a valid trust is to be created the donor
must "finally and forever abandon all control over the fund
during his lifetime." That neither of these statements were
justified by precedent is evidenced by the fact that revocable
living trusts had been used and their validity recognized for
more than four hundred years before the Ohio decisions were
written. (6) There is no authority of consequence indicating
that reservation of income to the donor for life, or of so much
income and principal as is necessary for his support, will render a trust testamentary, even if coupled with a power of revocation. If, however, powers, in addition to those above mentioned, are reserved to the donor we strike the point where
difficulty of decision begins and divergence in the opinion of
courts occurs.
In the case of McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings
Bank, decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
1919 (7) and Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings and Trust Co., de-

cided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1924 (8) the
power to withdraw principal upon demand was held to create
a testamentary trust. In the latter case the theory of the
court was that while a power of revocation was proper, because its use would extinguish the trust, a power of withdrawal was bad, because through its use the donor could
reacquire the property pursuant to the terms of the trust, but
as Professor Scott says, "This distinction would seem to be
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rather fine-spun." (9) The McEvoy case was decided on
the theory that during her lifetime the donor's rights as beneficial owner were not limited in any material way. While it
has been attempted to reconcile this decision with seemingly
contrary decisions of the same court (10), it is the writer's
opinion that the case must be regarded as an anomaly in the
Massachusetts law. The McEvoy and Warsco cases demonstrate that the inclusion of a power of withdrawal may afford
grounds for an attack upon its validity of the trust. In other
cases the facts have led the courts to hold that the conveyance
was colorable and not real, and that having the semblance of
a gift, but the substance of a will, was nugatory, as where the
deceased, in his lifetime, executed a bill of sale by which he
sought to transfer property to his daughter and she at the same
time executed a power of attorney by which the deceased was
to receive the property and, during his lifetime, manage, control, and use the same. The property was delivered to the
daughter and she in turn redelivered it to the deceased. It
was held, in a suit against the executor for failure to include
the property in his inventory, that the property belonged to the
executor; that while the delivery of the property was not
incomplete for lack of formal assignment, there was a manifest mental reservation by the deceased which rendered the
delivery incomplete.
(11)
It should be noted that the
daughter had none of the usual duties of a trustee. Of like
import is a Colorado case (12) in which the deceased in, his
lifetime conveyed certain real estate in trust to pay the income
to him during his life, and upon his death "the trust shall
thereupon cease and determine and the premises hereby conveyed shall thereupon vest in my son." The trustee did not
exercise or attempt to exercise any control over the premises
while the donor lived and the deed of trust was not recorded
until after his death. In a suit by the administrator the court
decided the issues in his favor on the theory that the conveyance was colorable only. The case of Coston v. Portland
Trust Co., decided in favor of the administrator by the Supreme Court of Oregon in May 1929 (13) is to the same
effect. The trust deed was not recorded, the trustor held
every indicia of ownership, and there was neither change of
possession nor management. The trust instrument purported
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to convey title but by its terms full and complete control was
reserved to the trustor. While this case has been criticised
it appears to me to be sound. Such a transaction must be constructively fraudulent as to subsequent as well as existing
creditors. If the trustee had recorded the deed, or had taken
possession, I believe, and the court suggests, that the decision
might have been different.
In the case of Smith v. Ferguson, (14) a trust was declared to be testamentary, on the ground that to constitute a
valid gift inter vivos, it was essential that the property should
be delivered absolutely and unconditionally, that it must take
effect at once and completely and that it must be irrevocable.
The court states that gifts inter vivos have no reference to the
future. It is my opinion that the courts have rather often
confused two different types of gifts; one being the ordinary
gift inter vivos and the other a conveyance to a trustee. The
first must be irrevocable and the second may be either revocable or irrevocable. The distinction between the two has
been, drawn by implication in many well reasoned cases and
directly in some cases. (15) It is apparent that no revocable
living trust will stand the test of the technical rules applied
to ordinary gifts inter vivos. Even the Illinois Court has,
And the Wisupon occasion, drifted into this error. (16)
consin Supreme Court, while it may have decided the case
correctly applied the same test as lately as the year 1926. (17)
In the latter case the donor reserved full control of the property in question. during his lifetime. It is true that the act
which creates a living trust usually is, as its name indicates,
a gift inter vivos, but the gift is not subject to the same tests
which are applied if "A" in his lifetime gives a horse to "B",
which is what is technically known as a gift inter vivos. The
gift to the trustee is, by way of distinction, a voluntary trust,
an equitable gift, or a gift in trust. (18).
The cases mentioned illustrate the danger of reserving
too much con-trol, whether by the terms of the instrument or
by the subsequent method of handling the trust property and
the above and numerous other cases demonstrate that in suits
brought by the representative of the donor it may be claimed
as against the trustee:
(1) That the trust agreement created a mere agency
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which terminated at the time of the death of the principal,
(2) That the trust agreement was an attempted testamentary disposition of the property of the trust estate and was
void because not executed in accordance with the statute relating to the execution of wills,
(3) That the agreement was a secret conveyance and
as such was void as against all creditors, or,
(4) That it was merely colorable and was not intended
to and did not vest any real title in the trustee.
The question of a secret conveyance can be quickly disposed of. It is probably the law (as illustrated by the case
of Coston v. The Portland Trust Co.) that if the donor holds
every indicia of ownership and there is no change of possession or management of the estate, the deed, whether absolute
or in trust, is constructively fraudulent as to subsequent, as
well as existing, creditors. The other three objections that
may be raised (that the disposition is testamentary, that a mere
agency is created, or that the conveyance is colorable only)
stand in close relation to each other. For example, if there
is a purported conveyance of property to a trustee and the
control of the donor is so unlimited that the donor parts with
no real interest until his death, it may be said to be a testamentary disposition, a colorable conveyance, or the creation. of
a mere agency. Each of the three expressions is used to
denote a failure to vest a present interest in the remainderman,
and in every case the ultimate test must be whether a trust or
an agency was created. If, (although the conveyance was
absolute in form) an agency was created the conveyance was
colorable only and the gift to the remainderman testamentary,
and, inversely, if the gift was colorable merely or the gift
testamentary the relationship created must necessarily have
been that of principal and agent. As one of our courts said
"if the defendant has not shown himself to be trustee, he
must have been an agent of the plaintiff." (19) This test
of trust or agency has not been directly applied in many of
the cases which have been before the courts in this country,
but I believe it merits discussion. While in a few cases,
sometimes because of peculiar facts, and sometimes because
of faulty reasoning, the courts have refused to sustain, what
might be considered trusts, the majority of decisions, either
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directly or by implication, sustain the view that the determining factor as against personal representatives of the deceased
donor or others is whether a trust or an agency was created.
If this theory is correct it is not improper to consider the characteristics which distinguish a trust from an agency.
Tiffany (20) says "for the solution of this difficulty no
inflexible rule can be laid down; names are not conclusive,
and a case must be determined by the preponderance of the
conflicting characteristics contending for recognition." In
this connection the following rules may be noted:
a. A trustee has title to the trust property; an agent as such does not
have title to the property of his principal, although he may have powers with
respect to it.
b. An agent acts for and in behalf of his principal and subject to his
control; a trustee as such is not subject to the control of his beneficiary, except
that he is under a duty to deal with the trust property for his benefit in
accordance with the terms of the trust and can be compelled by the beneficiary
to perform this duty.
c. An agent may subject his principal to personal liabilities to third
persons; a trustee cannot subject the beneficiary to such liabilities.
d. An agency is created by the consent of the principal and the agent;
a trust may be created without the knowledge or consent of the beneficiary
or of the trustee.
e. An agency can be terminated at the will of either the principal or
the agent and is terminated by the death of either. A trust is not ordinarily
terminable at the will of either the beneficiary or the trustee nor by the death
of either.
f. A person may be at the same time both an agent and a trustee for
the same person. If an agent is entrusted with the title to property for his
principal, he is a trustee of that property. (20a)

The Supreme Court of the United States (21) makes similar
distinctions, saying that an agent represents and acts for his
principal, who may be either a natural or artificial person,
while a trustee may be defined generally as a person in whom
some estate, interest or power, in, or affecting property, is
vested for the benefit of another; that when an agent contracts
in the name of his principal, the principal contracts and is
bound, but the agent is not; that when a trustee contracts as
such, unless he is bound, no one is bound, for he has no
principal.
Applying the test of "conflicting characteristics" to the
most usual of the modern types of so-called living trusts, it
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appears that a true active trust is created and not an agency.
Assume a solvent donor, apt words of present conveyance, a
trustee designated as such, income to donor for life with
remainder in trust for wife and children, power in the trustee
to invest and reinvest, to sell or mortgage, to make decisions
as to what is income and what principal, to create reserves,
to issue proxies, to collect and pay income, to exercise rights,
to take part in reorganization, to secure and pay for insurance, to appoint successors, to deduct fees and generally to
hold and administer the trust property, with the right reserved to the donor to revoke, to withdraw principal, and to
amend the trust instrument, and the relationship created must
be that of trustee and cestui que trust. Each additional power
reserved to the donor, however, creates additional doubt.
Thus far, with respect to matters upon which there is
a divergence of opinion, only cases adverse to the validity of
trusts have been mentioned. It is my opinion, however, and
I will attempt to demonstrate that by the weight of judicial
authority, and in addition to the right to receive the income,
any one or more of the following powers may be reserved to
the donor without invalidating the trust:
1. Power to revoke in whole or in part and through the
exercise of such power to reach all or part of the principal of
the trust estate.
2. Power to modify or supplement, which includes
power to change the beneficiaries.
3. Power to direct, or consent to, sales, investments and
reinvestments.
The following are the cases relied upon as supporting
these conclusions:
Stone v. Hackett, Executor, decided by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts at the November term 1858. (22)
The case arose on a bill in equity to obtain instructions of the
court and the disposition of property held by plaintiff under
the following declaration of trust:
"This memorandum witnesseth: That I have in my hands 81 shares in
the Eastern Railway * * *, such shares standing in the name of Harriet
Kittredge or Harriet P. Kittredge as trustee. The said several shares were
purchased with the money of Dr. Rufus Kittredge * * * and are in my hands
in trust for the following purposes and uses, that is to say: The income * * *
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to be paid to the said Rufus Kittredge during his lifetime; and at his decease,
20 shares * ** to go to the Trustees of Donation for Education in Liberia,
Africa * * , said Rufus Kittredge retaining the right to modify said uses and
to revoke said trust.
Ellen K. Stone."

It appeared that in 1853 Dr. Kittredge, having purchased the stock and taken certificates in the name of Harriet
Kittredge or Harriet P. Kittredge, trustee (who had previously died after signing a declaration of trust similar to
the above) sent the certificates with blank transfers endorsed
thereon and signed by Harriet P. Kittredge to the plaintiff
Ellen K. Stone with the above declaration of trust which she
signed and returned to him. Dr. Kittredge died in 1854.
The beneficiaries under the trust instrument insisted upon its
validity. The widow answered that the stock enumerated in
the declaration of trust was never delivered or transferred to
the plaintiff, and that such transfer, if made, was testamentary
in its nature'and fraudulent and void. A. R. Hatch of New
Hampshire for the widow argued that the transaction lacked
the essential elements of a gift inter vivos, in which he said
the donor must part not only with the possession, but the dominion, over his property, and that the gift if otherwise valid
was but an evasion of the Statute of Wills and a fraud on the
widow. The court stated that the solution of the question was
to be found in the well-established, equitable principle that
a voluntary gift or conveyance of property in trust when fully
completed and executed will be regarded as valid, and its
provisions will be enforced against all persons excepting
creditors or bona fide purchasers without notice; that if the
agreement or contract be executed by a conveyance of property in trust so that nothing remains to be done by the creditor
to complete the transfer of title, the relationship of trustee
and cestui trust is deemed to be established; that in the instant
case there was a legal transfer of the property fully executed
with a full and explicit declaration of trust executed and
delivered; that nothing therefore was left in fieri; that the
transaction was a completely executed transfer of property
and fully created a trust which, according to long established
principles, a court of equity was bound to recognize and
enforce. The above is probably the leading American case.
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Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., decided by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in February 1925 is another leading
case. (23) This was a suit in equity by an administrator for
the recovery of property alleged to belong to the estate of
his intestate. The deceased had conveyed the property to the
defendant trust company upon trust to hold, manage, etc., to
pay the income to the deceased during her life, or in accordance with her directions, and at her decease to distribute
among numerous named beneficiaries. Power was reserved
to alter or amend the instrument and to require the trustee
to pay over to the maker "at one time or from time to time
such portion or all of the principal of the trust fund as may
be requested." The court sustained the trust upon the authority of Stone v. Hackett, (supra), stating that while in that
case the instrument of trust was slightly less explicit than the
one in the case at bar, it nevertheless, contained unequivocal
power of modification and revocation with requirement of
payment of income to the donor during life. It says of Stone
v. Hackett, that the case has been cited many times-always
with respect; that it has been regarded as an unshaken authority and may be treated as a rule of property.
Keck v. McKinstry, decided by the Supreme Court of
Iowa November 13, 1928. (24) We consider this one of
the most able opinions which we have found in our examination of this subject and believe that the conclusions and the
reasons upon which they are based accurately reflect the correct and majority rule in the United States. The facts are
substantially as follows: In June 1914 one John McKinstry
executed an ordinary warranty deed to his son "Albert McKinstry, his-heirs and assigns forever", conveying the land in
question. On. the same day he executed a declaration of trust
reciting the execution of said deed and stating that the land
conveyed by said deed was to be held by the said Albert
McKinstry in trust upon certain uses, among which were, that
the maker during his lifetime should have the right- of possession, the rents and profits, and all of the elements and rights
of a life estate in the trust property; that after the maker's
death the trustee should hold for certain other uses. The
maker reserved the right to change or amend the provisions
of the trust agreement and to demand and require the trustee
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to convey or transfer to him or to such other person as he
should designate, such parts or portions of the trust fund
as the maker might select and on such terms as he might prescribe. The suit was brought by Keck, substituted trustee,
against certain heirs of Albert McKinstry and heirs of John
McKinstry, the maker. The Petition prayed establishment
of title in plaintiff as trustee and directions for administration
of the trust. It was claimed as against the trustee that the
trust agreement was testamentary only; that the trustor or
maker retained the whole beneficial interest, including the
right to incumber, to alienate, to appoint a new trustee and
in short the complete power of disposal; that he parted with
no dominion over the property, and that the trustee became
his mere agent; that the agency was revoked and that the
trust merged in the legal estate by the reversion to the maker
on the death of Albert, the first trustee. In sustaining the
validity of the trust the court said:
"Appellants rely on Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust Co., 183 Wis.
156; 196 N. W. 829; McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201

Mass. 50; 87 N. E. 465.

These two cases involved certificates of deposit,

the possession of which was pjaced by the so-called settlor in the so-called
trustee. The trustee was required to pay to the trustor any of the amount
of the deposit at any time. Those cases have no analogy to a conveyance of
the legal estate in real property to one in trust for the use of the grantor
during his lifetime and of other named beneficiaries and for distribution to
them after his death. Here the legal estate in real property was conveyed to
Albert McKinstry. It passed a present estate. By their agreement, the
parties separated the legal and equitable estate. It is not claimed that the
power of revocation invalidated the conveyance and declaration of trust as
a trust. It cannot be claimed that the trust was merely passive. Active duties
were imposed upon the trustee for the benefit of beneficiaries other than as
well as including the trustor. It can make no difference that the trustor
retained the active management of the property during his lifetime, and that
the performance of active duties by the trustee was postponed until after the
death of the trustor, and that performance of the trustee's duties was contingent upon his surviving the trustor. The trustee acquired the legal title
to the property, and in equity an estate to the extent that would be necessary
to enable him to perform his duties. Manifestly that estate was in trust.
The duties required of Albert McKinstry, whether in law or in equity, were
not duties to a principal, a superior as such, to be performed for, and in the
name of, John McKinstry. The acts of Albert McKinstry in the performance of his duties would not be the acts of John McKinstry. They would
be his own acts and in his own name as trustee. The arrangement has no
semblance either in name or purpose of an agency."
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Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., decided by the Supreme
Court of Illinois October 19, 1929, (25). This was a suit
by three heirs of the donor to cancel a trust agreement by
which the deceased in his lifetime conveyed corporate stock
to the Trust Company. The instrument provided that the
income should be paid to the donor during his lifetime and
reserved to him the right to vote the corporate stock, and the
right by will or deed, to revoke the trust deed in whole or in
part or change or alter any of the trusts created by it. The
court held that the powers reserved were only powers, and
not estates, and did not enlarge the life estate; that there was
a valid present conveyance, and that even though made in lieu
of a will it was not a testamentary disposition of the property.
This is a very strong, well reasoned case.
Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., decided by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in 1914. (25) This was a suit by a
surviving husband to cancel a voluntary deed of trust of personal property executed by his wife in her lifetime, and for a
decree that the property formed part of the assets of her
estate. The trust deed provided for income to the donor for
life, and reserved to her the right to rescind, revoke, or annul
the trust in whole or in part and to change or amend the terms
and provisions of the instrument. It was also provided that
the trustee could not invest in other than legal securities without the donor's written consent. The husband contended that
the deed was in fraud of his marital rights; that it was testamentary and that it was a mere nominal transfer-the standard
objections. It was held that the trust was a valid non-testamentary disposition of the property.
Adams v. Hagerott, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit in September 1929. (27)
Suit by
Adams to be adjudged the owner, as trustee, of certain certificates of stock found among the property of A. D. Gaines,
deceased, and praying that the administrator be required to
deliver the certificates to him. It appears that Gaines, the
deceased, in his lifetime conveyed the certificates in question
to Adams in trust to pay Gaines the income for life and after
death for other uses. No powers were reserved but on the
same day on which he received the certificates, Adams, the
trustee, endorsed all of the certificates to the donor and re-
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delivered them to him. It was held that whether this act
indicated a desire to insure the receipt of income, or of managing the investments, or to reserve a power to revoke, a valid
trust was created.
The cases of Kelly v. Parker, decided by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in 1899 (28), Van Cott v. Prentice, decided
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of New York in 1887 (29)
and Allen v. Hendrick, decided by the Supreme Court of
Oregon in 1922 (15) are even more favorable to the reservation of broad powers to the donor than any of the cases above
cited and are authority for the proposition that if there is an
otherwise valid conveyance to a trustee the donor may properly reserve full control of the property during his lifetime.
Other cases might be cited but it would appear to be unnecessary.
To recapitulate, it is believed that on the authority of
the above cases and many others not cited, the donor may
reserve the right during his lifetime to receive the income,
to revoke in whole or in part, to modify or supplement and
to direct or consent to sale, investments or reinvestments. The
Denver Committee in its report reached like conclusiohs but
made recommendations in connection therewith which were
substantially as follows:
1. As few as possible of the above powers should be
incorporated in a trust agreement. The appearance of too
many such powers may afford a basis for the contention that
the conveyance to the trustee is merely colorable and a reservation of unrestricted control may constitute the agreement a
mere agency.
2. Avoid the use of the following words or phrases,
which might render the agreement an agency or a testamentary disposition:
"Bequeath or devise"
"Agency or custodianship"

3. Avoid the use of the following phrases, which might
be construed to prevent a vesting in interest until the death
of the settlor:
"At my death the trust shall thereupon terminate."
"If I do not revoke this trust during my lifetime then
upon my death the estate shall be paid to A."
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4. Do not fail to use granting words sufficient to vest
the legal title in the trustee. Say "Sell, assign, and transfer"
and do not say "deposit" or "deliver" alone.
5. As a matter of policy and in order to avoid litigation,
it is well to have the disposition conform as far as possible
with the laws governing the descent and distribution of intestate property.
In summarizing, the Committee cautioned against the use
of any form of agreement which reserves so many powers or
which gives the donor such unrestricted control of the management of the trust as might subject the agreement to the
criticism that the donor had in fact parted with nothing by
virtue of the conveyance, and that the agreement was for that
reason merely colorable or feigned or constituted a mere
agency. It was recommended that the agreement should contain at the very most only a reservation of life income, together with power in the donor to revoke, modify, amend, supplement, change the beneficiaries, and add to the trust property, and that the only restriction on the control of the trustee
should be that it should make whatever sales and reinvestments the donor might direct; that these reservations should
be regarded as an absolute maximum, and that any additional
powers or reservations suggested by the donor should be discouraged.
The following quotations from the tentative draft of the
Restatemen.t of the Law of Trusts indicate that the views above
expressed are in substantial accord with the present opinion
of the Committee which prepared the draft:
"If by the terms of the trust an interest passes to the beneficiary during
the life of the settlor, the trust is not testamentary merely because the settlor
reserves a beneficial life estate nor because he reserves in addition a power to
revoke the trust in whole or in part and a power to modify the trust.
"If the settlor reserves not only a beneficial life estate and a power to
revoke and modify the trust but also an unlimited power to control the trustee
as to the details of the administration of the trust, the intended trust is a testamentary trust." (30)

In conclusion it is the opinion of the writer, with regard
to the effect of reserved powers, that, assuming an otherwise
valid trust, any powers may be reserved so long as the trustee
is not deprived of all of the duties which are ordinarily incident to the management of a trust estate, but that in every case
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this general rule should be modified to meet the requirements
of the laws of the state in which, if the trust is attacked, its
validity will be determined.
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